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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/444,095	11/22/1999	SOFI M. IBRAHIM	ARMY-123	8187

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CAROLINE M. NASH  
NASH & TITUS  
3415 BROOKSVILLE ROAD  
SUITE 1000  
BROOKSVILLE, MD 20833

[REDACTED] EXAMINER

SISSON, BRADLEY L

[REDACTED] ART UNIT      [REDACTED] PAPER NUMBER

1634

DATE MAILED: 02/25/2003

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

<b>Office Action Summary</b>	<b>Application No.</b>	<b>Applicant(s)</b>
	09/444,095	IBRAHIM, SOFI M.
	<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Art Unit</b>
	Bradley L. Sisson	1634

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --  
**Period for Reply**

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

#### **Status**

- 1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 09 December 2002.
- 2a) This action is FINAL.                            2b) This action is non-final.
- 3) Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.
- Disposition of Claims**
- 4) Claim(s) 31-35,38,39,63 and 65-70 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are allowed.
- 6) Claim(s) 31-35,38,39,63 and 65-70 is/are rejected.
- 7) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ is/are objected to.
- 8) Claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

#### **Application Papers**

- 9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) The drawing(s) filed on 22 November 1999 is/are: a) accepted or b) objected to by the Examiner.  
 Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
- 11) The proposed drawing correction filed on \_\_\_\_\_ is: a) approved b) disapproved by the Examiner.  
 If approved, corrected drawings are required in reply to this Office action.
- 12) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

#### **Priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 120**

- 13) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) All b) Some \* c) None of:
1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. \_\_\_\_\_ .
3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- \* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(e) (to a provisional application).
- a)  The translation of the foreign language provisional application has been received.
- 15) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120 and/or 121.

#### **Attachment(s)**

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)                    | 4) <input type="checkbox"/> Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). _____ . |
| 2) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)           | 5) <input type="checkbox"/> Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)  |
| 3) <input type="checkbox"/> Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) _____ . | 6) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____                                     |

## DETAILED ACTION

### *Specification*

1. The attempt to incorporate subject matter into this application by reference to the numerous publications as found at pages 8 and 9 of the specification is improper because applicant has not pointed with particularity to why each of the documents has been incorporated and what portion of the document has been incorporated. As set forth in *Advanced Display Systems Inc. v. Kent State University* (Fed. Cir. 2000) 54 USPQ2d at 1679:

Incorporation by reference provides a method for integrating material from various documents into a host document--a patent or printed publication in an anticipation determination--by citing such material in a manner that makes it clear that the material is effectively part of the host document as if it were explicitly contained therein. *See General Elec. Co. v. Bremner*, 407 F.2d 1258, 1261-62, 159 USPQ 335, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1968); *In re Lund*, 376 F.2d 982, 989, 153 USPQ 625, 631 (CCPA 1967). **To incorporate material by reference, the host document must identify with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents.** *See In re Seversky*, 474 F.2d 671, 674, 177 USPQ 144, 146 (CCPA 1973) (providing that incorporation by reference requires a statement "clearly identifying the subject matter which is incorporated and where it is to be found"); *In re Saunders*, 444 F.2d 599, 602-02, 170 USPQ 213, 216-17 (CPA 1971) (reasoning that a rejection or anticipation is appropriate only if one reference "expressly incorporates a particular part" of another reference); *National Latex Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.*, 274 F.2d 224, 230, 123 USPQ 279, 283 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1959) (requiring a specific reference to material in an earlier application in order to have that material considered a part of a later application); *cf. Lund*, 376 F.2d at 989, 13 USPQ at 631 (holding that **a one sentence reference to an abandoned application is not sufficient to incorporate from the abandoned application into a new application**). (Emphasis added.)

The present application broadly incorporates a host of documents without identifying with detailed particularity what specific material it incorporates and clearly indicate where that material is found in the various documents. Accordingly, the specification has been considered as though none of the documents has been incorporated by reference.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112***

2. The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

3. Claims 31-35, 38, 39, 63, and 65-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, because the specification, while being enabling for the isolation of DNA where a wash buffer of 1.0 M NaCl, 50 mM MOPS, 15% ethanol, pH 7.0 is used along with an elution buffer of 1.25 M NaCl, 50 mM Tris HCl, 15% ethanol, pH 8.5, where the sample ranges in size from 10-1000 µl and the elution step further comprises heating the sample to 65 C, does not reasonably provide enablement for the use of alternative wash, elution buffers, sample sizes, and reaction conditions.

As set forth in *Enzo Biochem Inc., v. Calgene, Inc.* (CAFC) 52 USPQ2d at 1135, bridging to 1136:

To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue experimentation.' " *Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S*, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365, 42 USPQ2d 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting *In re Wright*, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561, 27 USPQ2d 1510, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Whether claims are sufficiently enabled by a disclosure in a specification is determined as of the date that the patent application was first filed, see *Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.*, 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 USPQ 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986).... We have held that a patent specification complies with the statute even if a "reasonable" amount of routine experimentation is required in order to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must not be "undue." See, e.g., *Wands*, 858 F.2d at 736-37, 8 USPQ2d at 1404 ("Enablement is not precluded by the necessity for some experimentation . . . However, experimentation needed to practice the invention must not be undue experimentation. The key word is 'undue,' not 'experimentation.' ") (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). In *In re Wands*, we set forth a number of factors which a court may consider in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation. These factors were set forth as follows: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims. *Id.* at 737,

8 USPQ2d at 1404. We have also noted that all of the factors need not be reviewed when determining whether a disclosure is enabling. See *Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 1200, 1213, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that the Wands factors "are illustrative, not mandatory. What is relevant depends on the facts.").

4. The specification does not enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the invention commensurate in scope with these claims. As presently worded, the claimed methods encompass the use of virtually any lysis, wash and elution buffer and sample size. Of the four prophetic examples provided, only Example 1, pages 11-12, is related to the claimed invention. The prophetic example asserts that RNA could be isolated by the disclosed method; however, the presence of ribonucleases in a sample would readily destroy any RNA present. The method does not disclose the use of any agent that would prevent such degradation. Additionally, none of the claims recite any step that would allow for the preservation of RNA while in the presence of degradative enzymes such as ribonucleases. In view of such art-recognized difficulties, and finding no claimed limitation that would allow for the isolation of RNA while being subjected to a degradative environment, the skilled artisan would have to develop alternative, and non-disclosed methods. Such alternative methods would require a level of experimentation beyond the routine experimentation that is allowed for under 35 USC 112, first paragraph.

5. For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, applicant is urged to consider narrowing the claims to those embodiments adequately supported by the disclosure.

6. Claims 31-35, 38, 39, 63, and 65-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

7. Attention is directed to the decision of *Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar* 19 USPQ2d 1111 (CAFC, 1991):

This court in *Wilder* (and the CCPA before it) clearly recognized, and we hereby reaffirm, that 35 USC 112, first paragraph, requires a “written description of the invention” which is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. The purpose of the “written description” requirement is broader than to merely explain how to “make and use”; the “applicant must also convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the “written description” inquiry, whatever is now claimed.

The claimed method encompasses the purification of any quantity of DNA or RNA from any sample using any extraction buffer, wash buffer and elution buffer under any condition. A review of the specification, however, finds support for one wash and one extraction buffer and one prophetic set of conditions under which they are to be used. As noted above, the largest sample size contemplated was but 100 µl. While one may assert that alternative embodiments would be obvious, obviousness does take the place of an adequate written description of the invention such that the specification reasonably suggests that applicant was in possession of the full scope of the claimed invention. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 43 USPQ2d at 1405, citing *Lockwood v. American Airlines Inc.* (Fed. Cir. 1997) 41 USPQ2d at 1966:

Recently, we held that a description which renders obvious a claimed invention is not sufficient to satisfy the written description requirement of that invention.

Accordingly, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, applicant is urged to consider narrowing the claims to those embodiments adequately supported by the original disclosure.

***Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103***

8. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

9. The factual inquiries set forth in *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) are summarized as follows:

1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.
3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.

10. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later

invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).

11. Claims 31-35, 38, 39, 63, and 65-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Van Ness et al., (US Patent 5,514,785) in view of Boom et al., JP 7-308184 A and Wiggins (US Patent 5,637,687).

12. Van Ness et al., column 2, last two paragraphs, disclose the use of dipsticks that comprise beads and that nucleic acid are bound to the support. Column 8 teaches use of the beads in hybridization assays

13. Van Ness et al., do not disclose binding of nucleic acids to a silica oxide support, elution of captured nucleic acids, or use of a cap/wand/tube arrangement.

14. Boom et al., disclose that the binding of DNA to silica particles (applicant's silica oxide) is well known in the art. Boom et al., also disclose lysis, binding, and washing steps.

15. Boom et al., do not disclose use of a device that comprises a cap being integral to a wand and that when the wand is placed in a tube, it a sealing closure is affected.

16. JP 7-308184 discloses a wand that is integral to a cap lid and that when brought into closing proximity, a seal is established. The wand can be used for collection of biological samples that are in turn subjected to PCR.

17. Wiggins, column 4, bridging to column 5, disclose eluting captured nucleic acids from solid support that can comprise beads.

It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to have modified the method of Van Ness et al., whereby the dipstick was substituted with the wand/cap/tube of JP 7-308184 such that biological samples could be collected and processed,

and the nucleic acid material immobilized on the microstructures as disclosed by Van Ness et al., and Boom et al. would be eluted as disclosed by Wiggins. In view of the detailed guidance provided, the skilled artisan would have been both motivated and would have had a reasonable expectation of success. While the prior art clearly teaches performing lysis, washing and elution of nucleic acids, the selection of the number and duration of lysis, binding and elution steps and associated tubes is considered to be a matter of routine optimization. It is well settled that routine optimization is not patentable, even if it results in significant improvements over the prior art. In support of this position, attention is directed to the decision in *In re Aller, Lacey, and Hall*, 105 USPQ 233 (CCPA 1955):

Normally, it is to be expected that a change in temperature, or in concentration, or in both, would be an unpatentable modification. Under some circumstances, however, changes such as these may impart patentability to a process if the particular ranges claimed produce a new and unexpected result which is different in kind and not merely in degree from the results of the prior art. *In re Dreyfus*, 22 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 830, 73 F.2d 931, 24 USPQ 52; *In re Waite et al.*, 35 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1117, 168 F.2d 104, 77 USPQ 586. Such ranges are termed "critical" ranges, and the applicant has the burden of proving such criticality. *In re Swenson et al.*, 30 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 809, 132 F.2d 1020, 56 USPQ 372; *In re Scherl*, 33 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1193, 156 F.2d 72, 70 USPQ 204. However, even though applicant's modification results in great improvement and utility over the prior art, it may still not be patentable if the modification was within the capabilities of one skilled in the art. *In re Sola*, 22 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1313, 77 F.2d 627, 25 USPQ 433; *In re Normann et al.*, 32 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1248, 150 F.2d 708, 66 USPQ 308; *In re Irmscher*, 32 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1259, 150 F.2d 705, 66 USPQ 314. More particularly, where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, it is not inventive to discover the optimum or workable ranges by routine experimentation. *In re Swain et al.*, 33 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1250, 156 F.2d 239, 70 USPQ 412; Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Coe, 69 App. D.C. 217, 99 F.2d 986, 38 USPQ 213; *Allen et al. v. Coe*, 77 App. D. C. 324, 135 F.2d 11, 57 USPQ 136. (Emphasis added)

For the above reasons, and in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, claims 31-35, 38, 39, 63, and 65-70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).

*Conclusion*

18. The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Nabai et al. (US Patent 5,483,972) discloses a device used for collection of biological samples that comprises a sealing cap, a wand and a tube.
19. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Bradley L. Sisson whose telephone number is (703) 308-3978. The examiner can normally be reached on 6:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Thursday.
20. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Gary Benzion can be reached on (703) 308-1119. The fax phone numbers for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned are (703) 872-9306 for regular communications and (703) 872-9307 for After Final communications.
21. Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (703) 308-0196.



Bradley L. Sisson  
Primary Examiner  
Art Unit 1634

BLS  
February 12, 2003